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Some UnConventional Thinking About Foreign Tax Credits
and the Advance Corporation Tax
H. David Rosenbloom*
Christine W. Booth"
T he purpose of this article is to revive a debate, or perhaps more
accurately to initiate a debate that should have taken place but never
did, on a complex but important question of international tax law. The
question is whether the United Kingdom's Advance Corporation Tax
(ACT) is a creditable income tax under section 901 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code and the Treasury Regulations that interpret section 901. The
debate never took place because the Income Tax Convention between
the United States and the United Kingdom effectively preempted it, by
providing rules for applying the U.S. foreign tax credit system to the
ACT.2 Those rules do not, however, address the status of the ACT
under the Code, an independent issue with important practical implica-
tions.
To appreciate the scope of that issue, it is necessary to traverse
some familiar ground: relief from international double taxation, the na-
ture of the ACT, the history of the Convention, and various interpreta-
tions of the Convention. We will keep this necessary contextual material
to a minimum.
Member, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Washington, D.C.; International Tax Counse4
U.S. Treasury Department 1978-81; A.B. Princeton University, 1962; J.D. Harvard University,
1966.
.. Senior Manager, KPMG Peat Marwick, Washington National Tax, Washington, D.C.; A.B.
University of Michigan, 1974; M.A. The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, 1976; J.D. Case
Western Reserve University, 1989.
1 The Advance Corporation Tax was originally enacted as part of the U.K. Finance Act of
1972, principally sections 84-92 and schedule 12. The current provisions are contained in the
U.K. Income and Corporation Tax Act of 1988 (hereinafter ICTA). The U.S. foreign tax credit
provisions are generally in sections 901-908 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Treasury Regula-
tions relevant to this discussion are in sections 1.901-1 through 1.901-2A.
2 The Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1978, U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T.
5668 (entered into force April 25, 1980) [hereinafter the Convention]. The Convention was
signed on December 31, 1975, but was amended by notes and several protocols before being
approved by the Senate on July 9, 1979 and by the House of Commons on February 18, 1980.
Instruments of ratification were exchanged in Washington on March 25, 1980. The Convention
was brought into force with retroactive effect to 1975 and, in certain respects, to 1973.
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I. RELIEF FROM INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
The United States taxes its residents, including domestic corpora-
tions, on worldwide income.' Taxation of the same income by two or
more distinct taxing jurisdictions (double taxation) is subject to mitiga-
tion under provisions of U.S. domestic tax law and, independently, un-
der bilateral income tax treaties to which the United States is a party.4
In the absence of a treaty, U.S. residents who pay income taxes, or
taxes in lieu of income taxes, to foreign jurisdictions may either deduct
those taxes pursuant to Code section 164(a) or claim credits against their
U.S. income tax under the provisions of Code sections 901-908.' The
foreign tax credit provisions relevant to the discussion here are sections
901 (the direct foreign tax credit), for foreign taxes paid by the taxpay-
er, and section 902 (the deemed paid foreign tax credit), for foreign
taxes paid by a foreign corporation but deemed, under specified circum-
stances, to have been paid by a U.S. corporate shareholder.
The foreign tax credit provisions of the Code represent a unilateral
effort by the United States to mitigate international double taxation. The
U.S. tax treaty network, on the other hand, constitutes an attempt,
through bilateral negotiation, to refine the domestic legal system so that
it will operate effectively country by country.
United States tax treaties prohibit the use of a treaty to restrict
benefits otherwise available under local law.6 This means that a taxpay-
er covered by a treaty provision may choose between its benefits and
those available under the Code.7
The Convention contains a provision to this effect in Article 27(2):
See I.R.C. § 1, 11 (1992) (imposing tax on the "taxable income" of individuals and cor-
porations respectively); I.R.C. § 63 (1992) (defining "taxable income" as "gross income" minus
allowable deductions); I.R.C. § 61 (1992) (defining "gross income" as income "from whatever
source derived"); I.R.C. §§ 871(b)(2) (1992), and 882(a)(2) (1992) (effectively limiting worldwide
taxation to U.S. residents).
This is the function of all U.S. income tax treaties.
Foreign tax credits are also available in limited circumstances to foreign persons. See
I.R.C. § 906 (1992).
6 1 J. Ross MACDONALD, ANNOTATED TOPICAL GUIDE TO U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES, Pt.
A, § 3, Protection of Taxpayers' Rights (1992 Supp.).
7 A limited exception to this ability to choose the more advantageous provision was sug-
gested when the Service denied a taxpayer's request to invoke a provision of the United States -
Poland treaty with respect to the treatment of business income while continuing to treat business
losses under the provisions of the Code. Rev. Rul. 84-17, 1984-1 C.B. 308. U.S. courts have
never addressed whether such "cherry picking" is permissible. See Harvey P. Dale, "Cherry Pick-
ing" - Treaty or Code, Not Both, 13 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 181 (1984) (stating that "bilateral
income tax treaties can only help, not hurt, the taxpayer").
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This Convention shall not restrict in any manner any exclusion, exemp-
tion, deduction, credit, or other allowance now or hereafter accorded by
the laws of the Contracting State.
This language makes clear that if double taxation relief is available
under the Code, the Convention does not and cannot withdraw such
relief. The problem at hand, however, is that a fair reading of the Con-
vention suggests that its negotiators believed ACT payments were not
creditable under the Code. This (largely unexamined) assumption has
forestalled virtually all discussion of the Code issue.
In fact, the Code provisions governing the foreign tax credit,' the
Treasury Regulations interpreting those provisions,9 and the evolution
and nature of the ACT all support the position that the ACT is a credit-
able income tax under the Internal Revenue Code. If that conclusion is
correct, taxpayers need not invoke the Convention in order to qualify
ACT payments for the credit; and the extensive rules regarding credit-
ability in the Convention and the various Treasury and IRS interpreta-
tions of the Convention must be viewed as nonexclusive alternatives to
the Code rules governing creditability, rather than the Hobson's choice
that those interpretations purport to be.
H. THE ADVANCE CORPORATION TAX
The ACT is an integral part of a system intended to alleviate dou-
ble taxation of corporate earnings, a subject that is distinct from (but
necessarily related to) the international double taxation that occurs when
different taxing jurisdictions tax the same income. Double taxation of
corporate earnings occurs under a so-called "classical" system of corpo-
rate taxation, or any system that retains classical elements. In a classical
system (such as the one currently in force in the United States), a cor-
poration pays tax on its income, and shareholders pay additional tax on
amounts received as distributions out of after-tax corporate earnings.1"
Systems designed to eliminate or ameliorate this double taxation through
"integration" of the corporate and individual taxes have been implement-
a See supra note 1.
9 Id.
"0 Although the classical system does tax corporate earnings twice, once in corporate hands
and once in the hands of shareholders, the intercorporate dividends received deduction and the
consolidated return provisions serve to prevent more than one layer of tax on corporate earnings.
However, those relief provisions are not generally applicable to dividends from foreign corpora-
tions. See I.RLC. §§ 243(a) & 1504(b)(3) (1992). As a result, a U.S. corporation that is a share-
holder of a foreign corporation will generally have U.S. taxable income if the foreign corporation
pays a dividend.
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ed in many other countries and considered repeatedly in the United
States, but never enacted."
One form of integration involves "imputation" of the corporate tax
payment to the shareholder. Under this approach a shareholder who
receives a cash dividend from a corporation may claim a credit for the
portion of the corporate tax attributable to the dividend received. The
shareholder reports as income both the cash dividend and the amount of
corporate tax attributable to the dividend and claims a credit against his
own income tax liability for the "imputed" corporate tax. Under this
system there is only one tax on corporate earnings instead of two, and
that one tax is collected from the corporation, subject to final applica-
tion based on the personal situation and status of the shareholder.
Such a system has been in place in the United Kingdom for most
of that country's income tax history, with the exception of the period
from 1965 to 1972, when a classical system prevailed.' 2 The problem
that triggered adoption of a classical system in the United Kingdom was
that, under certain circumstances, the imputation system permitted a
recipient of a dividend to claim a credit for corporate tax when no
corporate tax was actually collected.13
When, in conformity with the rules promulgated by the EEC,'14 the
United Kingdom returned to an imputation system in 1972, it sought to
avoid the leakage that was possible under its earlier system. The mecha-
nism chosen to achieve the desired result - the ACT - is unique
among countries employing imputation systems. 5 The ACT is a pay-
" See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT'S
TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 120-129 (1985);
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND GROWTH 135-144
(1984); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977). See
also Hugh J. Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 461 (1978); Charles E. McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes:
The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975); Mitsuo
Sato & Richard M. Bird, International Aspects of the Taxation of Corporations and Sharehold-
ers, 22 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 384 (1975); Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on
"Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335 (1975).
12 See Peter Holdstock, The U.K. Imputation System: The Peculiarities of ACT, PRICE WA-
TERHOUSE INT'L TAX NEWS (No. 24, May/June 1978). See also Biddle v. Commissioner, 302
U.S. 573 (1938) (involving the U.K.'s former imputation system).
13 For a more complete discussion of the difficulties with the prior U.K. imputation system,
see Holdstock, supra note 12, at 2.
4 For a general discussion of corporate taxation in the EEC during this period, see John
Chown, The Harmonisation of Corporation Tax in the EEC, 1976 BRIT. TAX REV. 39 (1976).
," For general descriptions of the mechanics of the ACT, see Holdstock, supra note 12;
Marianne Burge, The New Revamped U.K. Corporate Tax System: How It Will Operate, 37 J.
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merit to the U.K. Treasury from a U.K. corporation upon a qualifying
distribution to shareholders.' 6 It is distinct from the normal U.K. corpo-
ration tax (the "mainstream tax"), which is assessed annually on taxable
corporate earnings.' 7 It is also distinct from the U.K. tax on individu-
als. However, payment of the ACT triggers two credits, one for the
corporation against its mainstream tax and one for the corporation's
shareholders against their tax.18
The ACT credit available to offset a corporation's mainstream tax
is subject to a limitation to ensure that mainstream tax liability cannot
be fully expunged by the ACT. 9 The ACT credits that cannot be used
because of this limitation may be carried back six years and forward
indefinitely." Unused ACT may also be surrendered to designated af-
filiates.2 However, with minor exceptions, the ACT is not refundable
to the distributing corporation.'
As in any imputation system, the shareholder adds his proportionate
share of the ACT payment to the cash dividend received and reports the
sum of the two as taxable income. The shareholder then claims a credit
for his share of the ACT paid by the distributing corporation. Because
the ACT is payable by the corporation and only retrievable by that cor-
poration as an offset against mainstream tax, the risk of shareholder
credits in the absence of corporate tax payments is eliminated.
The ACT rate is set so that, when applied to the cash dividend
plus the amount of the credit (the grossed-up dividend), it will equal the
basic rate of individual U.K. income tax.' That rate, for the year end-
ing March 31, 1991, was 25 percent and the ACT rate for that period
TAX'N 110 (1972); Marianne Burge, New U.K. Corporate Tax May Require Changes in the Way
U.S. Business Operates There, 37 J. TAX'N 160 (1972).
" The ACT provisions define "qualifying distributions" by reference to the definition in
section 209 of the ICTA. That definition encompasses dividends and other distributions "except
so much of the distribution, if any, as represents repayment of capital on the shares . . .
ICTA § 209(2)(b). The authors do not claim knowledge of the subtleties of U.K. tax or corpo-
rate law, but U.K. statutes are drafted in English and it would appear that this provision is
intended to preclude application of the ACT with respect to at least some corporate distributions.
'7 ICTA § 6.
B ICTA § 239 (set-off against corporate tax liability); ICTA § 231 (credit for recipient of
qualifying distribution).
9 ICTA § 239(2).
2o ICTA § 239(3). As originally enacted, the carryback period was two years. The Finance
Act of 1972, Ch. 41 § 85(3) and (4) (Eng.).
21 IcTA § 240(l)(a)-(b). Permissible surrenderees must be U.K. resident corporations and
must be at least 51% owned by the surrendering corporation. Id. at § 240(10).
2' This is a limited right to a refund in situations involving "franked investment income."
See infra notes 26, 27, and 46.
23 IcTA § 14.
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was therefore 25/75ths of the cash dividend amount. Assuming a U.K.
corporation subject to a 35 percent tax rate pays out all its after-tax
income as dividends, the ACT would operate in the following manner:
Corporate taxes
Pre-tax income 100.00
Income taxes:
ACT (25/75 x dividend amount of 65) 21.67
U.K. corporation tax at 35% 35.00
less: ACT credit (25/75 x 65) (21.67)
Net mainstream tax 13.33
Total income tax paid (35.0)
After tax profit and dividend paid
to shareholder 65.00
Shareholder taxes
Dividend received 65.00
add: ACT credit 21.67
Shareholder taxable income 86.67
U.K. individual tax at 25% 21.67
less: ACT credit (21.67)
Shareholder tax due 0
A U.K. shareholder who is.not subject to full tax because of losses,
other relief, or charitable status, will receive the ACT credit as a re-
fund.24 Under U.K. tax law a corporate shareholder is not normally
subject to U.K. income tax on dividend income.25 Unlike individual
shareholders, however, corporate shareholders are not entitled to ACT
refunds. 26 Rather, dividends with accompanying ACT credits received
by corporate shareholders ("franked investment income") may be distrib-
uted by those corporate shareholders without further ACT payments to
the United Kingdom.27
24 ICTA § 231(3).
2' ICTA § 208.
26 ICTA does not state that corporate shareholders are not entitled to refunds, however, it
does provide alternative treatment (franked investment income) for such shareholders.
2' If no distributions are made during the taxable year in which franked investment income
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As a matter of U.K. domestic law, there are no ACT credits or
refunds for foreign shareholders, individual or corporate. Thus, in the
absence of a tax treaty, the ACT is payable by a U.K. corporation with
respect to distributions to foreign shareholders, but is not available as a
credit to such shareholders. Such distributions are not, however, subject
to a separate tax at source under U.K. domestic law.
H. THBE CONVENTION
Although the primary purpose of bilateral income tax treaties is to
eliminate double taxation of income subject to the taxing jurisdiction of
both treaty partners, it is not surprising that, following the adoption of
the ACT system in the United Kingdom, the Convention would address
the extent to which an otherwise purely domestic tax benefit would be
made available to foreigners.2" After all, the ACT has an impact upon
cross-border investment and, from the U.S. point of view, arguably
discriminates against U.S. ownership of U.K. corporations. What is most
noteworthy for present purposes, however, is that the Convention, aug-
mented by subsequent interpretations, provides in detail the manner in
which the ACT is to be treated for purposes of the U.S. foreign tax
credit.29 This aspect of the Convention suggests an assumption by the
drafters that, absent the Convention, the ACT would not be a creditable
tax under U.S. domestic foreign tax credit rules. If the drafters had
believed that the ACT was fully creditable under U.S. principles, Con-
vention foreign tax credit rules would have been unnecessary.
In fact, the Convention addresses both the obligations of the United
Kingdom with respect to ACT paid by U.S.-owned U.K. companies and
the U.S. foreign tax credit implications of such payments.3" With re-
spect to the availability of ACT benefits to U.S. shareholders, Article 10
is received, the surplus franked investment income may be carried forward to shelter future dis-
tributions from ACT. ICTA § 241(3). In addition, corporations with surplus franked investment
income whose operations have generated a loss for the year may, under specified conditions,
offset their losses against the surplus franked investment income and claim a repayment of the
ACT associated with the franked investment income. ICTA § 242.
2 The ACT provisions of the Convention have been discussed by numerous commentators.
See, e.g., Marianne Burge, New U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty Brings Novel Approach to International
Transactions, 44 J. TAX'N 294 (1976); Joseph D. Franzi & A. David Barron, How U.S. Foreign
Tax Credits React to U.K.'s ACT: Part I, 1984 TAX PLAN. INT'L REv. 8 (Sept. 1984) and Part
II in 1984 TAX PLAN. INT'L REv. 11 (Oct. 1984); Walter Lamp, Dividend Provisions of Pro-
posed U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty, 55 TAXEs - THE TAX MAGAZINE 300 (1977); Stanley G.
Sherwood, ACT Refunds Under the New U.K. Treaty, 6 INT'L TAX J. 336 (1980); W.B. Taylor
& J.D.B. Oliver, The Proposed United States - United Kingdom Double Taxation Agreement,
1976 BRrr. TAX REv. 166 (1976).
9 See infra part IV.
30 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 10, 23.
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provides that when dividends are paid to a U.S. corporate shareholder
under specified conditions, the shareholder shall be entitled to a payment
from the United Kingdom equal to one-half of the ACT credit available
to an individual U.K. shareholder, subject to a "deduction withheld" not
to exceed 5 percent of the aggregate of the cash dividend plus the
one-half credit.31 The conditions under which this treatment is applica-
ble are that the U.S. corporation, either alone or together with one or
more associated corporations, controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10
per cent of the U.K. corporation paying the dividend.32 Such sharehold-
ers will be referred to hereafter as "qualifying shareholders."33
Using the earlier example, a qualifying shareholder entitled to a
cash dividend of 65 would receive 65 + 10.84 (1/2 the ACT paid) or
75.84, less a 5 percent (3.79) deduction from that total amount for a net
cash receipt of 72.05 (75.84 - 3.79). Of this amount, 65 would come
directly from the U.K. corporation and 7.05 would come via the U.K.
Treasury as a refund of ACT paid by the U.K. corporaion. 34 In other
words, ignoring the "deduction," this provision places a qualifying
shareholder in the same position as a U.K. individual shareholder who is
unable to make use of one-half of an ACT credit, i.e., the qualifying
shareholder becomes entitled to an ACT refund.
The interaction between the ACT and the U.S. foreign tax credit is
addressed in two separate articles of the Convention. Article 10 provides
that the aggregate of the cash dividend received by a U.S. shareholder
(either a qualifying shareholder or otherwise) plus the amount of the
ACT credit received, less the applicable "deduction," shall be treated as
31 See Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1151, 1210-37 (1981) (criticizing the manner in which the Convention negotiators arrived at the
one-half ACT refund formula and describing the Convention as endorsing "tax sparing").
32 Convention, supra note 2, art. 10.
33 The Convention also provides that other U.S. shareholders (including individuals and
nonqualifying corporate shareholders) shall be entitled to payment from the United Kingdom of
the entire ACT credit available to individual U.K. shareholders, subject to a "deduction" not to
exceed 15 percent of the aggregate of the dividend plus the credit. Convention, supra note 2,
art. 10(2)(a)(ii). This distinction between shareholders who receive one-half the ACT refund and
those who receive the full ACT refund generally reflects the distinction between "direct" inves-
tors (those eligible for the deemed paid foreign tax credit of Code section 902) and portfolio
investors.
34 See Finance Act, 1989, § 115 (Eng.). That section was enacted to clarify that the 5 per-
cent deduction is to be based on the gross amount of the dividend plus the one-half ACT credit.
A 1988 U.K. case interpreting the Convention had upheld a taxpayer's contention that the 5
percent deduction should be based on the amount of the tax credit actually paid rather than on
the sum of the dividend plus one-half of the ACT credit. See Union Texas Int'l Corp. v.
Critchley, [1990] S.T.C. 305 (Feb. 27, 1990) (affirming the High Court's decision). Section 115
effectively restricts the holding in Union Texas to the taxpayer in that case.
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a dividend "for United States tax credit purposes. '35 Article 23 pro-
vides that the amounts "withheld" (deducted) from amounts paid to U.S.
shareholders are to be treated for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes as an
income tax imposed on the recipient of the dividend. 6 In addition, in
cases involving distributions to qualifying shareholders, Article 23 pro-
vides that the one-half of the ACT credit not paid to such shareholders
shall be treated as an income tax imposed on the U.K. corporation pay-
ing the dividend. 7
Absent subsequent interpretations, these Article 23 provisions appear
to be relatively simple statements of creditability under the foreign tax
credit provisions of Code section 901 (the direct foreign tax credit) for
payments treated as having been made by the shareholder,3 and sec-
tion 902 (the deemed paid foreign tax credit) for payments treated as
having been made by the corporation distributing the cash dividend.39
Their principal aim, it appears, is to identify the proper taxpayer and, in
the case of the ACT and the amounts "withheld" from recipients, to
assure that a credit is available for the amount the United Kingdom is
not required, under the Convention, to refund.40
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The U.S. Treasury Department issued a Technical Explanation of
the proposed Convention on March 9, 1977 four months in advance of
3s Convention, supra note 2, art. 10.
6 Id., art. 23.
37 Id.
38 I.R.C. § 901 (1992).
39 I.R.C. § 902 (1992). See infra Part V. Because the United Kingdom does not impose a
separate tax at source on amounts paid as dividends by U.K. corporations to foreign sharehold-
ers, it is likely that amounts treated as payments by a shareholder solely by reason of the Con-
vention would not otherwise qualify for a credit in the United States. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-
2(0; see infra note 40.
o Identifying the particular taxpayer entitled to the foreign tax credit has been a dilemma
throughout the history of the credit. See, e.g., Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573 (1938)
(under the former U.K. imputation system, tax paid by a U.K. corporation upon a distribution to
shareholders is, for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes, tax on the corporation and not on the share-
holders). Biddle followed what has been termed a "technical taxpayer' or "legal liability- analy-
sis, focusing on the identity of the entity or individual legally liable for the tax in the foreign
jurisdiction. More recent cases (at least in the context of taxes withheld at source) appear to
have shifted the focus to a test that seeks to identify the party whose income is being taxed
rather than the party who bears liability for the tax payment. See, e.g., Nissho Iwai American
Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 765 (1987); First Chicago Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1774 (1991); Gleason Works v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 464 (1972); Continental Ill. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1325 (1988), aff'd sub nom., Citizens & Southern Corp. v.
Commissioner, 900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990); Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M.
(CCH) 3023 (1992).
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hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a full three
years before instruments of ratification were exchanged and the Conven-
tion was brought into force.4" On the day the Convention was brought
into force the Internal Revenue Service issued a Revenue Procedure
interpreting it.42 Thus, at the moment the Convention took effect, it
was already subject to two substantial exegeses.
The Convention treats the ACT not refunded to qualifying share-
holders as a tax paid by the distributing U.K. corporation.4 3 If the ACT
was creditable under the U.S. foreign tax credit system, it would be
allowable as a credit in the year of the distribution, when the liability to
make the tax payment to the U.K. Treasury became fixed.44 The Tech-
nical Explanation and the Revenue Procedure, however, ultimately treat
unrefunded ACT as a tax paid by the distributing corporation (or, al-
ternatively, as a tax paid by a surrenderee corporation if the unused
ACT is surrendered) in the year in which the corporation's mainstream
tax is reduced by an ACT credit.45 In other words, the documents that
officially interpret the Convention treat the ACT in a manner different
from that contemplated by the U.S. statutory foreign tax credit provi-
sions.
The Technical Explanation supports its interpretation of the Conven-
tion in the following terms:
In the United Kingdom tax system, ACT serves a dual function.
To the extent that it offsets the United Kingdom corporate income tax
imposed without regard to distributions (hereinafter referred to as the
"mainstream tax"), it is analogous to a payment of regular corporate
income tax. To the extent that it does not offset mainstream tax, it is
more analogous to a tax imposed on distributions which are income to
the shareholders.
41 Technical Explanation of the Convention, 1980-1 C.B. 455. Two versions of the
Treasury's Technical Explanation were released; the first was issued on March 9, 1977 and the
second was issued on July 1, 1977. Both versions placed limits on the creditability of ACT, al-
though the precise limitations differed slightly. Only the second (revised) Technical Explanation
represents the official view of the Treasury Department, and only its provisions will be referred
to here.
42 Rev. Proc. 80-18, 1980-1 C.B. 623.
43 Convention, supra note 2, art. 23.
44 I.R.C. §§ 901, 902, 905 (1992).
41 Rev. Proc. 80-18, 1980-1 C.B. at 625; Technical Explanation, 1980-1 C.B. at 472-473.
The interpretive documents, consistent with the Convention, allow a foreign tax credit for the
ACT upon accrual of the liability to the United Kingdom. However, later application of the ACT
credit or surrender of the ACT credit results in a recomputation of the foreign tax credit along
the lines described in the text.
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To reflect this hybrid nature of ACT, ACT which offsets main-
stream tax will be attributed to the earnings of the year in which it
offsets such tax and treated as if it were regular corporate tax. ACT
which does not offset mainstream tax will generally be attributed to the
accumulated profits of the year of distribution.'
This describes the approach taken in the Technical Explanation, but says
little about rationale. U.K. law leaves no doubt that the ACT must be
paid upon every qualifying distribution. The fact that a credit against
other U.K. taxes may be available is entirely independent of the fact of
the ACT payment. Under the ACT provisions of U.K. law, once ACT
has been paid to the U.K. Treasury, it cannot be refunded to the corpo-
ration that has paid it. 7 Clearly, the approach taken in the Technical
Explanation reflects someone's judgment that an ACT payment, by
itself, has no legal effect under the U.S. foreign tax credit system.
The Revenue Procedure relies on the authority of the Technical
Explanation to conclude that, where ACT credits are surrendered by a
distributing U.K. corporation, only the surrenderee affiliate is deemed to
have paid a tax for U.S. purposes, and the ACT refunded pursuant to
the Convention will not be considered a distribution from the subsidiary
surrenderee in the absence of certain specific actions by the surrenderee
and its parent company.48 The Revenue Procedure recites that computa-
tion of the U.S. foreign tax credit must be made "pursuant to the rules
and examples set forth in the Treasury Explanation," even though a
surrender situation is not discussed in the Technical Explanation.
The interpretations contained in the Technical Explanation and the
Revenue Procedure were echoed by a 1986 Competent Authority
Agreement addressing creditability of the ACT under the Convention.49
All three of these interpretive documents were considered by the United
4 1980-1 C.B. at 472-73.
'4 A minor exception exists where a corporation receives "franked investment income" later
in a taxable year in which a qualifying distribution has been made. Because distributions made
out of "franked investment income" are not subject to the ACT, amounts paid as ACT during a
taxable year prior to receipt of such "franked" income may be refunded to the corporation.
ICTA, ch. 1, sched. 13, 4(2) (Eng.).
4S Rev. Proc. 80-18, 1980-1 C.B. 623 at 625, as amended by Rev. Proc. 90-61, 1990-2 C.B.
657.
4 The Convention contains a "Mutual Agreement Procedure" under which the parties to the
Convention agree that the "competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to
resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention." Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. The 1986 Competent Authority
Agreement was entered into (in the form of an exchange of letters) pursuant to this provision.
These letters are reproduced in full in Xerox v. United States, 14 Cl. CL 455, 464-66 (1988).
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States Claims Court in Xerox v. United States,50 a case involving an
ACT credit surrendered to a U.K. subsidiary corporation. Relying pri-
marily on the Revenue Procedure, the Court held that where the U.K.
corporation paying the dividend had surrendered its ACT credit, the U.S.
shareholder was not entitled to a foreign tax credit under Article 23 for
the one-half of the ACT not refunded. The court deferred in large mea-
sure to the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service interpreta-
tions of the Convention.51 This deference was accorded despite the fol-
lowing language in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report
recommending ratification of the Convention: "[I]n recommending ratifi-
cation of the treaty, the Committee does not intend to adopt or reject
the amplifications of the foreign tax credit rules contained in the Trea-
sury technical explanation. '52 The Xerox opinion is, however, limited
by. its terms to "the treaty issue. 53 The argument that foreign tax cred-
it relief is available under U.S. domestic law, without regard to the
Convention, was not considered by the court.
In a more recent case, Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, the
Claims Court approached the Technical Explanation with less defer-
ence.' As in Xerox, the taxpayer in Snap-On Tools claimed a credit
under the Convention for unrefunded ACT. In this case, in computing
the credit, the taxpayer took the position that both dividends received
during 1978 and dividends received during the first 60 days of 1979
should be treated as having been made out of accumulated profits of
1978. The taxpayer relied on the 60-day rule of Code section 902 to
support its position.55 The Revenue Service disallowed a portion of the
credit attributable to the dividends paid during the 60-day period on the
authority of the Technical Explanation, which explicitly rejected the
60-day rule.56 Noting that the Convention itself does not address the
60-day rule, the Court rejected the argument that the Technical Explana-
tion was controlling. It relied on the language of Article 27 of the Con-
vention (regarding the primacy of domestic law) to conclude that "resort
'0 14 Cl. Ct. 455 (1988).
5I Id. at 462-63.
52 EXEc. REP. No. 95-18, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 36-37 (April 25, 1978), reprinted in
1980-1 C.B. at 429.
53 Xerox, 14 Cl. Ct. at 455.
54 Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 CI. Ct. 1045, 1052 (1992).
55 Section 902, as in effect for the years in question in Snap-On Tools, limited the deemed
paid foreign tax credit to the amount of tax attributable to dividends paid out of the accumulated
profits of a taxable year of a foreign corporation. The 60-day rule permitted a dividend paid
within 60 days of the close of a taxable year to be treated, for section 902 purposes, as if it
were paid out of the profits of the prior taxable year.
m See 1980-1 C.B. at 473.
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to preparatory materials" was not necessary. 7 As a result, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer.
As in Xerox, the Snap-On Tools court did not address whether the
ACT is creditable under the Code in the absence of the Convention. The
court never reached that question, emphasizing instead the literal lan-
guage of the Convention as opposed to the interpretation placed upon
the Convention by later Treasury and Revenue Service pronouncements.
However, the court's refusal to defer to the Technical Explanation is
also consistent with the position that creditability under the Code re-
mains an open question. Moreover, the result reached by the Claims
Court is harder to defend if creditability of the foreign levy depends ex-
clusively upon the Convention. For if it does, it would seemingly have
been appropriate for the Court to have deferred to the Technical Expla-
nation. In other words, the court's willingness to eschew Convention
interpretations may reflect an underlying doubt about whether creditabili-
ty of the ACT is solely a function of the Convention.
Even if the official interpretations of the Convention are accorded
the same weight as the Convention itself, however, a taxpayer who
seeks relief from double taxation without invoking the Convention can-
not be bound by such interpretations.
V. CREDrrABnLTY OF THE ACT UNDER THE CODE
Analysis of U.S. domestic law must begin with the fact that, not-
withstanding the history of the ACT under the Convention, no official
U.S. pronouncement has ever stated that the ACT fails to qualify as a
creditable tax under the Internal Revenue Code. The closest any public
statement has ever come to such a position is the following excerpt
from the Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
Convention:
It is open to question whether, in the absence of the proposed
treaty, the unrefunded ACT would be treated as a creditable income
tax for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes. On the one hand, although the
unrefunded ACT may be viewed economically as a foreign tax with
respect to income of the U.S. shareholders because it is imposed with
respect to dividend income paid to them, it is imposed on the paying
U.K. corporation rather than the U.S. shareholder receiving the distri-
bution and thus probably would not be allowed as a direct income tax
credit to the U.S. shareholder.
On the other hand, although it is a tax imposed on the paying
Snap-On Tools, 26 C1. Ct. at 1073.
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U.K. corporation, it is not imposed with respect to income of the pay-
ing corporation, but rather on all distributions made by the U.K. corpo-
ration, whether out of taxable income, out of untaxed earnings, or out
of capital. Under present IRS ruling policy, in order for a foreign tax
to qualify for the U.S. foreign tax credit, it must be imposed on the
net gain of the taxpayer (determined by allowing the deduction of the
generally significant expenses incurred in the production of that in-
come), it must be imposed only on income that is realized, and it must
be imposed on the receipt of income rather than some other transac-
tion. It would appear that, at least in form, the ACT would not satisfy
these criteria. There is, therefore, a reasonable possibility that the ACT
would not be viewed by the IRS as a creditable tax in the absence of
the proposed treaty.51
This, of course, is neither a position of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice nor a firm conclusion of the Committee. Moreover, the description
of the ACT in the Senate Report does not appear to be correct. ACT is
not imposed on "all distributions" by a U.K. corporation. It is not im-
posed, in particular, on distributions that represent "repayment of capital
on the shares."59 Moreover, its place and purpose in the overall U.K.
imputation system make it clear that the ACT was intended to fall
mainly if not solely, on earnings, including earnings from prior years.
ACT may reach earnings not reached by U.K. mainstream tax, and it
may reach some earnings that, under U.S. principles, would be viewed
as a return of capital; but the aim of the ACT and its principal target in
fact is normal corporate earnings.
Finally, neither the thought processes nor the beliefs of the individ-
uals involved in negotiation of the Convention is relevant to the issue at
hand. Regardless of whether they assumed that the ACT was not other-
wise creditable or simply side-stepped the question in favor of a treaty
resolution, it is evident that creditability analysis under the Code can
and must proceed on a clean slate.
A. Development of U.S.Creditability Standards
The sole statutory standard for determining which foreign levies are
creditable as income taxes is section 901(b)(1), which provides a credit
for "the amount of any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes
paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country . ..."60
" EXEC. R P. No. 95-18, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 33-34 (April 25, 1978) (footnotes omit-
ted).
59 See supra note 10.
60 Section 903 provides a credit for taxes "in lieu" of income taxes. I.R.C. § 903 (1992).
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The term "income taxes" is not defined in the Code, and its meaning
was thus left to the courts. In 1938, the Supreme Court in Biddle v.
Commissioner61 set forth a principle that, in expanded form, has been
employed in all subsequent interpretations of the foreign tax credit pro-
visions. The principle is that a foreign levy, in order to be creditable,
must be substantially equivalent to an income tax in the U.S. sense.
This principle was refined in a 1943 Third Circuit case, Keasbey &
Mattison Co. v. Rothensies,6 in which a U.S. taxpayer had been denied
a foreign tax credit for a Quebec Mining Tax triggered by consumption
or shipment of ore. The court upheld the denial of the credit, enunciat-
ing two conditions for creditability: (1) that a tax must be levied on net
gain or income in the U.S. sense, and (2) that the income subject to the
tax must have been realized. These principles remained in place, subject
to further judicial gloss, and by the mid-1970s had been crystallized by
the standards set forth in the Court of Claims and Tax Court decisions
in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assoc. v. Commission-
er.
63
The foreign taxes at issue in Bank of America were gross income
taxes levied on banking revenues. The principles that emerge from the
cases are: (1) that a gross tax is generally not an income tax; (2) that
only foreign taxes "very highly likely" or "reasonably intended" to reach
net gain are income taxes; (3) that a foreign tax must allow for deduc-
tions in order to be a creditable income tax; (4) that creditability must
be tested for the classes of taxpayers subject to the tax and not on the
basis of individual taxpayers; and (5) that creditable foreign taxes must
be imposed on realized net income. Thus, as of the early 1970s, the
statutory provision addressing foreign tax credits had not been changed
for more than fifty years and the evolution of creditability standards had
proceeded in a more or less orderly fashion in the courts. It was there-
fore not surprising that a spate of Revenue Rulings in the latter half of
the 1970s denying creditability for various foreign taxes gave rise to
controversy. 4
The Rulings came in the wake of considerable pressure on and
close scrutiny of the foreign tax credit rules of the United States in the
That provision is not relevant here, as the ACT is not "in lieu of- an income tax.
6' 302 U.S. 573.
6' 133 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943).
63 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949; 61 T.C. 752 (1974), aftd, 538
F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976).
6 See ABA Tax Section Committee on Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers, The Credit-
ability of Foreign Income Taxes: A Critical Analysis of Revenue Rulings 78-61, 78-62, and 78-
63, 32 TAx LAW. 33 (1978).
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mid-1970's as a result of the run-up in oil prices and heavy foreign
taxation of oil extraction income, following the OPEC-induced oil price
shock of 1972-73.61 In May 1976, the Revenue Service published Rev-
enue Ruling 76-215, dealing with the creditability of Indonesian "pro-
duction sharing" payments.' This was followed by a July 14, 1976
News Release dealing with the standards for crediting foreign taxes
incurred by taxpayers engaged in extracting mineral resources owned by
foreign governments. 67 A host of further rulings were published in
1978, including a significant one, Revenue Ruling 78-63, dealing with
Saudi-Arabian and Libyan oil taxes.68
Shortly thereafter, the Treasury Department announced that it was
opening a regulation project on the creditability of foreign taxes. 69 This
project led to proposed regulations in June 1979 and the adoption of
proposed and temporary regulations in November 1980.70 These regula-
tions were substantially amended, and issued in final form, in 1983, 7'
and they continue to form the basis for determining creditability of
foreign taxes to this day.72
B. Current Standards
The final foreign tax credit regulations simplified the task of ana-
lyzing a foreign levy to test whether it meets U.S. standards for credit-
ability. To be creditable under section 901, the levy must: (1) be a
"tax," and (2) have a "predominant character" of an income tax in the
U.S. sense.73 Of course these questions imply that the foreign payment
65 Id.
6 Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194.
67 News Release IR-1638 (July 14, 1976).
6s Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228.
6 The regulation project was opened on June 1, 1978. See T.D. 7918 (October 6, 1983),
reprinted in 1983-2 C.B. 113, 114.
70 T.D. 7739 (Nov. 12, 1980), reprinted in 1981-1 C.B. 396.
71 T.D. 7918 (October 6, 1983), reprinted in 1983-2 C.B. 113.
' A number of articles accompanied the development of the final foreign tax credit regula-
tions. See, e.g., D. Kevin Dolan, General Standards of Creditability Under §§ 901 and 903
Final Regulations - New Words, Old Concepts, 13 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 167 (1984); Daniel
Horowitz, et. al., The Final Foreign Tax Credit Regulations: A Summary and Analysis, 21 TAX
NoTES 203 (1982); Daniel Horowitz, et. al., The Proposed Foreign Tax Credit Regulations: Inter-
pretations, Comparisons, and Comments, 19 TAX NOTEs 171 (1983); Edward H. Lieberman,
Whether and to What Extent a Foreign Tax is Creditable Under Final Regulations, 60 J. INT'L
TAX'N 98 (1984); Price Waterhouse, New Proposed Regulations for Determining the Creditability
of Foreign Taxes, 9 INT'L TAX J. 387 (1983).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a).
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be isolated as a "separate levy."74 The ACT meets all of these require-
ments.
1. Separate Levy
The regulations provide that the benchmark for determining whether
a payment is a "separate levy" is U.S. principles, and that where the
base of a levy differs "in kind" and not merely "in degree" from the
base of other levies, it will be a separate levy for foreign tax credit
purposes. A clear example of a separate levy would be a levy by a
lesser political subdivision, such as a state, or municipality. Similarly,
the regulations use the separate U.S. taxes on corporations, personal
holding companies, foreign corporations, and FICA taxes as examples of
separate levies."
Although the determination of "separateness" can be difficult, ACT
appears to qualify as a separate levy under the foregoing provisions. It
is based on the amount of a qualifying distribution, while U.K. main-
stream tax is based on all corporate earnings, whether or not distributed.
As the Claims Court noted in Xerox, a distributing corporation must pay
the ACT "whether or not it has any U.K. corporation tax liability."76
The ACT is not refundable and therefore is not an estimated tax, and it
is independent of the U.K. corporation mainstream tax. The fact that the
ACT may be credited against mainstream tax liability is not relevant.
The foreign tax credit regulations provide rules for "multiple levies,"
making clear that the possibility of crediting one levy against another
has nothing to do with "separate levy" analysis. Moreover, when one
levy is credited against another, it is the former levy that is considered
paid. On this analysis it would be the ACT, not mainstream tax, that
would qualify for the credit.77
2. Tax
The regulations provide that a separate levy is a "tax" if it is "a
compulsory payment pursuant to the authority of a foreign country to
levy taxes," and not compensation for "a specific economic benefit."'78
Payments to foreign governments in the nature of penalties, fines, and
customs duties are not "taxes" within the meaning of this provision.
71 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.901-2(a) and 1.901-2(d)(1).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(d)(1).
76 Xerox, 14 Ct. CI. at 458.
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(4).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2).
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A prime example of, and the principal reason for, the "specific
economic benefit" language is a payment made in return for the right to
extract government-owned petroleum and other minerals.79 The purpose
of the "tax" requirement is to deny foreign tax credits for such quid pro
quo payments to foreign governments masquerading as taxes.
The ACT is clearly a "tax" within the meaning of this provision
because it is "a compulsory payment pursuant to the authority of a
foreign country to levy taxes." There is no possible argument that an
ACT payment is really a disguised transfer in exchange for a govern-
ment benefit "specific" to a particular taxpayer. All distributions (with
the exception of those out of "franked investment income") are subject
to the ACT and the only benefit arising from payment of the ACT is a
credit that is not limited to specified taxpayers but available, under
varying conditions, to all.8"
3. Predominant Character
Having cleared the "separate levy" and "tax" hurdles, the analysis
passes to whether the predominant character of the ACT is an income
tax in the U.S. sense. This provision of the regulations essentially incor-
porates the elements developed by the courts as discussed above. In
other words, it requires an analysis of the realization, gross receipts, and
net income tests. The rules do not, however, require exact conformity to
the legal standards developed by the courts. Instead, they call for a
judgment about the "predominant character" of the levy being analyzed.
In this regard the regulations can be viewed as a relaxation of the judi-
cially created standards.
(a) Realization
A foreign tax satisfies the realization requirement if, judged on the
basis of its predominant character, it is imposed "subsequent to the
occurrence of events that would result in the realization of income under
'9 See supra text accompanying notes 66-72. See also Lieberman, supra note 72, at 99.
80 Technically, the regulations provide that the "predominant character" test will be satisfied
if (1) the tax is likely to reach net gain in normal circumstances and (2) the tax is not depen-
dent upon the availability of a credit in another foreign country. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(3). The
first of these requirements - the net gain requirement - is merely shorthand for the realization,
gross receipts, and net income tests. The second requirement, the so-called "soak-up" tax pro-
vision, is designed to deny foreign tax credits for foreign taxes that are imposed solely because
a credit from another country is available. This second requirement is irrelevant in the case of
the ACT. Thus, the "predominant character" test resolves itself into an inquiry into the "net
gain" requirements.
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the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.""1 Corporate
distributions are events that occur subsequent to the realization of corpo-
rate earnings. Therefore, the ACT meets the realization test because it is
a tax imposed on corporate distributions.
An example in the Treasury Regulations holds that a branch profits
tax imposed when realized net income is remitted or deemed to be
remitted satisfies the realization test.82 This is because a levy subse-
quent to the occurrence of events that would result in realization under
U.S. principles is not objectionable from a U.S. foreign tax credit stand-
point. There is no meaningful distinction between this example and the
ACT insofar as the realization test is concerned.
(b) Gross Receipts
A foreign tax satisfies the gross receipts requirement if, based on
its predominant character, it is imposed on the basis of net income
attributable to actual gross receipts.83 The purpose of this provision is
to deny a foreign tax credit for a tax levied on nonincome items or on
a "formulary" basis, where the tax base might yield a foreign tax higher
than one based on transactions at fair market value.
There is nothing to suggest that the ACT applies to artificial gross
receipts or to gross receipts determined on a formulary basis. ACT is
imposed on qualifying distributions, which are generally made out of
actual gross corporate receipts less the expenses necessary to generate
those receipts. Therefore, the ACT satisfies the gross receipts test.
In fact, there are only two possible sources of funds for corporate
distributions: earnings and capital. Contrary to the assertion in the Sen-
ate Report, the ACT cannot be imposed on distributions out of capital
for two distinct reasons. First, U.K. company law prohibits distributions
out of capital." Second, under U.K. tax law the ACT applies only to
qualifying distributions, and distributions are defined for that purpose so
as to exclude distributions out of capital.85 Therefore, under U.K. law,
the base upon which ACT is imposed is predominantly comprised of
income.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(2)(A).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(2)(iv), example (3).
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(3)(i)(A).
84 U.K. Companies Act of 1980, § 39(l) ("a company shall not make a distribution ...
except out of profits available for [that] purpose." )
'5 ICTA §§ 14(12) & 209(2)(b).
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(c) Net Income
Finally, a foreign tax satisfies the net income requirement if, judged
on the basis of its predominant character, the base of the tax is comput-
ed by reducing gross receipts to permit recovery of significant costs and
expenses. Alternatively, the requirement is satisfied if the tax base is
computed under a method likely to produce an amount that approxima-
tes or exceeds recovery of significant costs and expenses. 6 The thrust
of this test, like the others, is to restrict creditability to foreign taxes
that are essentially equivalent to U.S. income taxes. The second part of
the test is designed to permit a tax credit for foreign taxes imposed
under a system that does not permit recovery of certain costs and ex-
penses recoverable under U.S. law, provided that the system includes
allowances that effectively compensate taxpayers for such nonrecovery.
The ACT applies to qualifying distributions which, as noted above,
must generally be made out of the profits of the distributing corporation.
There is no hint in U.K. law that those profits are derived under a
system that fails to allow for recovery of significant costs and expenses.
Those same corporate profits form the base for U.K. mainstream corpo-
ration tax, which is doubtless itself a creditable income tax. Of course,
neither the mainstream tax nor the ACT has a base that is identical to
the one used under the income tax provisions of the Code, but such
identity is not required. Therefore, the ACT satisfies the net income test.
In sum, the ACT meets all of the tests designed to determine
whether its predominant character is that of an income tax in the U.S.
sense. Having satisfied those tests as well as the "separate levy" and
"tax" requirements, the ACT must be fully creditable as and when paid.
This conclusion is buttressed by evidence that, at one point, the
Internal Revenue Service itself suggested that the ACT was a creditable
tax under the Code. By Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury dated May 7, 1980, concerning an earlier proposed version of
the regulations that had attempted to address (at least in part) the credit-
ability of the ACT,8 7 the Commissioner stated: "An issue not resolved
" Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i).
87 Section 4.901-2(f)(4)(iv) of the 1980 proposed and temporary foreign tax credit regulations
read as follows:
(iv) Advance corporation taxes. If, pursuant to foreign law that partially
or fully integrates corporate and shareholder taxation, liability of a corpora-
tion for an amount, imposed with respect to a distribution of the
corporation's profits ("advance amount"), reduces liability of the corporation,
or a related corporation, for an income tax imposed on corporate profits,
whether or not distributed, then the corporate income tax is paid or accrued
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in these regulations is whether the advance corporation tax is a separate
charge. If it is a separate charge, it is probably an income tax because
it is imposed almost exclusively on distributions of realized net in-
come."
88
The rules regarding "separate charges" that appeared in the earlier
version of the regulations were completely rewritten, and replaced in
1983 by the "separate levy" rules discussed previously. However, the
provisions of the earlier regulations addressing "realized net income"
reflected the development of early case law in approximately the same
manner as the current regulations. Thus, the Commissioner's assertion
that the ACT is imposed on "distributions of realized net income" is as
valid under the current regulations as it was earlier.
CONCLUSION
It is probably not possible to determine with certainty whether
negotiation of the Convention proceeded upon an assumption that the
ACT was not a creditable tax under then prevailing U.S. standards of
creditability. What is clear, however, is that inquiry into the creditability
of the ACT outside the terms of the Convention all but ceased when the
Convention was brought into force. As a result, limitations on the credit-
ability of the ACT imposed by interpretations of the Convention have
been challenged (as in Xerox and Snap-On Tools) only by reference to
the language of the Convention itself. No one has suggested laying the
Convention aside and considering the proper result under the Code.
This article has attempted to do precisely that. It has maintained,
notwithstanding the views of Convention interpreters and the doubts
surrounding creditability of foreign taxes during the 1970s, that the ACT
is a fully creditable tax under current U.S. foreign tax credit rules.
The implication is that the Convention's treatment of the ACT
in the taxable year for which it is imposed and the advance amount is not
paid or accrued to the extent such amount reduces the corporate income tax.
The amount of corporate income tax paid or accrued is reduced to the ex-
tent the advance amount is paid or credited to shareholders of the distribut-
ing corporation.
This provision, which essentially treats the "advance amount" as an estimated tax payment
was found applicable to the ACT in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-39-060 (June 28, 1983) and Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8409002 (Sept. 23, 1983). However, it was deleted when the final 1983 regulations were
issued, and the subject of "integrated tax systems" was reserved. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(4)(ii).
The rationale for the deletion was not fully explained. It may be that, like the Xerox court, the
draftsmen found the conceptual basis for this rule to be untenable.
88 Tech. Mem. 1980-546 (1980), reprinted in, 1980 IRS Positions (CCH) 20,546 (emphasis
added).
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represents an alternative, as opposed to an exclusive, path through the
U.S. foreign tax credit system. The impact of such a conclusion on the
economic and political validity of the bargain struck between the United
States and the United Kingdom in the Convention is, as they say, be-
yond the scope of this article.
